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undei Uliili

Code Ann. § 78 ?a V?)(f) <\ii|i|i \WH).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
May a trial court reconsider an orally-announced but unwritten criminal

with the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment for the same offense?
This question entails questions of rule, statute, and const;
in this case, to nondeferential appellate review of the

Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471
(Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part,
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . .." Utah's statutory double jeopardy provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a)
(1995), similarly states, "No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense[.]"
Accord UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 12. Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and rules
54, 58A, and 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are copied in the appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wright was charged with possession of an incendiary device, a second degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995) (formerly "infernal machine," Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-10-306 through -308 (1990)) (R. 8-9). Through plea bargaining, he pleaded
guilty to attempted possession of an incendiary device, a third degree felony by operation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(3) (1995). After orally announcing that Wright would be placed
on probation (R. 77-79), the trial court reconsidered, and sentenced him to zero-to-five years
at the Utah State Prison-die allowable term for a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 763-203(3) (1995) (R. 38-39, 94). Wright appeals that stricter sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the underlying crime are gleaned from the charging information
and from statements at the several trial court hearings in this case. Wright and a friend
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The court also suggested that defense

counsel might then persuade tin torn! to seiilcnu ^'»ij»i»l
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report (R. 33, 70).
On 11 July 1994, Wright appeared for sentencing, although the. presentence
i /|i it ''till h M1 > of been completed (R. 73). The trial court t ^ w ^ e d concern
of a presentence report; how

i, irleuse counsel urged the court to senteiv

hout

llir ir| if 11,1""" ' \ "Mil Tllllif; p m s m i t o i agreed that Wright could be pid^cu uu ^ l u u a u u u \AX.
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The trial court had some information about Wright's criminal history, but desired m o r e
complete information; the court therefore requested a presentence report. (R. 63-64)
3

75-77). Accordingly, the trial court announced that it would suspend Wright's prison term
for the pleaded-to crime, and impose thirty-six months of probation, to include a twelve
month jail sentence plus payment of a fine, surcharge, and possible restitution. Jail release
would be possible upon subsequent confirmation that Wright was employed (R. 77-79).
That orally-announced sentence was never reduced to writing. Instead, on 18
July 1994—one week after its oral announcement of probation-the trial court convened
another brief hearing (R. 97-103). The court explained that because it had not received the
presentence report before the 11 July hearing, it had not signed the commitment order
placing Wright on probation:
As I proceeded with sentencing last week, I misunderstood that
there was in fact a presentence report on the way. And in fact, if you
recall, I was a bit in wonderment of why I only had effectively a
statement of the criminal history of the defendant, rather than a
complete presentence report.
It was only after the entire calendar that Mr. Wilson indicated to
me that there was a presentence report being prepared, and it just
wasn't completed. Because I was informed of that, I did not sign the
judgment. And as far as I'm concerned there is no judgment, there is
no sentence until I sign those papers.
The oral hearing and the court's statement at oral hearing is the
statement of what the court intends to do upon the preparation of the
papers. I now revoke what I intended to do, and we'll have a new
sentencing hearing based on this presentence report that has now been
completed and submitted to me today.
(R. 98-99). The trial court therefore continued sentencing to 01 August 1994 (R. 101).
On 01 August, Wright did not appear in court due to an apparent scheduling
glitch with jail transportation officers. However, through counsel, Wright proffered mental
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health information that he believed pertinent to sentencing (R I

i ,''n ^-i Jiii^l), Hit trial

court again continued sentencing, to 29 August 1994 (R. l w / .
At the 29 August hearing, Wright argued, through counsel, that the earlier,
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A I\ representative, giving attention to Wright's mental health history as therein
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reportet

treatment facility available to address Wright's uncertain mental health needs, the trial
sentenced him to zero-to-five years at the state prison (K JK, lil Wi

Hu aubt "VV
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remained in jail since the initial oral sentence announcement, the court credited that jail time
against his prison sentence (R. 94-95). This sentence was reduced to writing, signed and
filed I
to-fi

"i
m

' "ii" i1 "i ' 'ii ^mimics his double jeopardy-based challenge to the zero-

irs prison sentence.

The trial court's ruling that no sentence was imposed by its initial, oral
sentencing announcement is correct undei Utah I m

5

I 'asc law and Hit I I ah uniaxial and

civil procedure rules hold that no sentence or judgment exists until it is signed and entered by
the court. Contrary federal authority addresses due process concerns that are not present in
this case. Because no sentence was imposed by the trial court's initial, oral announcement,
there was no double jeopardy bar to the court's subsequent decision, duly signed and entered,
to sentence Wright to a prison term.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S ORAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF
PROBATION HAD NO LEGAL EFFECT UNDER UTAH LAW,
THERE WAS NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR TO WRIGHT'S
SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN PRISON SENTENCE
Wright correctly states that constitutional and statutory double jeopardy
principles bar "multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969); State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989); see U.S.
amend. V;

UTAH CONST,

CONST.

art. I § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a) (1995). He argues that

the trial court punished him twice for attempted possession of an incendiary device, violating
double jeopardy, by first orally stating that probation would be granted, but then
subsequently committing him to prison.
Wright's argument depends upon his premise that the trial court's initial oral
announcement that he would receive probation, never reduced to writing, constituted
"punishment" (E.g., Br. of Appellant at 8 ("the court lawfully imposed sentence;" id. at 1314 (oral statement about probation was a "lawful sentence")). As the trial court correctly
held (R. 82), that premise is false.
Under Utah law, there is no sentence, and hence no "punishment," until a
criminal judgment is entered in writing. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
6

19'8l final court's oral statement Qui ninety day piesenlcnu' « VJ'IHU"! i i»

nM IN. MMiyhl,

never reduced to writing, was properly rescinded after defendant's attempted escape); State
v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court's concurrent sentence statement, never
r •

--rinded, and consecutive sentences imposed, following

presentence evaluation requested by deti/w 1 ,, "M V \ Court stated, in Curry: "fT]he oral
statement from liii" i\ u.il J eluding defniiltnf'X snili'iiu .

writinp„ a

defendant's sentence was n»* .\4ered until September 7, 1990 HI e,, alter the mnety da>
evaluation)]

... — iti.jdi^
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-

has only been punished once for his offense—under the trial court's final, duly written and
entered sentence, Therefore, he has no double jeopardy claim.
liii h in

II i i I. .k'tiiifii h li'llii II'I! if. ,i criminal procedural rules.

Notwithstanding Wright's protestations (Br. of Appellant at 20), rule 22, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure,
fonn. That directive is readily apparent from rule
"issue its commitment setta

sentence

which requires the trial court to
w..» c e n requires the o l i n a delivumg "the

defendant to confinement iu ucnvci a true c~~v of the commitment to the jail or prison and
[to] make his return on the commitment and file it with the court, " H—Ur those acts

2

That result, this Court observed, was consistent mthHinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324,
481 P.2d 53 (1971), holding that a judgment is not final until entered in written form. Curry,
814 P.2d at 1151. In Hinkins, the supreme court dismissed the defendant's appeal from an oral
sentence for contempt of court, holding that no appeal could lie from a non-written order.
Accord Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 440 (1971) (sentence is final when
"pronounced and recorded on the docket" (quoting authority)).
7

require a written sentence, or commitment: they cannot be performed upon a mere oral
sentence announcement.
If needed, further clarification of the requirement that a sentence be entered in
written form comes from Utah's civil procedure rules, which "also govern in any aspect of
criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, provided, that any
rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement." Utah R.
Civ. P. 81(e). Under the civil rules, a judgment must be signed and filed to be valid. Rule
54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that a civil judgment "includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies." In turn, civil rule 58A(a) through -(c) prescribes that a
judgment is "entered," and final, only when signed by the trial judge (or court clerk in
certain instances) and filed. Accord Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53, 54
(1971) (oral sentence statement is not an appealable order); Newton v. State Road Comm'n,
23 Utah 2d 350, 463 P.2d 565, 567 (1970) (court's oral statements "are superseded by the
formal written findings and judgment"); McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah
1952) ("[N]o antecedent expressions of the judge can in any way restrict his absolute power
to declare his final conclusion, in the only manner authorized by law, to wit, by filing his
decision' . . . " (quoting authority)). Thus by operation of civil rule 81(e), a criminal
judgment has no legal effect until it is signed and filed. In this case, because the trial court's
initial sentencing announcement was never thus entered in written form, it had no effect.3

3

Several cases from other jurisdictions also support this result. E.g., State v. Mason, 833
P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Mont. 1992) (rejecting double jeopardy argument of type raised by
Wright); State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 344, 706 P.2d 875, 876-77 (N.M. App.) (same), cert,
denied, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (N.M. 1985).

8

The remaining inquiry, as indicated by civil rule 81(e), is whether any
constitutional provision commands the contrary rule urged by Wright—i.e., that a criminal
judgment is final upon its mere oral announcement by a trial court. This case presents no
occasion to fashion such a rule. United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987),
relied upon by Wright (Br. of Appellant at 17-21), compels no such rule. By its terms,
Villano holds that an orally-announced sentence is final and controlling only as a "settled
principle offederal criminal law," 816 F.2d at 1450 (emphasis added). The states, of
course, are not bound to follow federal criminal law in lockstep fashion. And neither Villano
nor the cases cited therein (cited in Br. of Appellant at 18-20 n.2) opine that states are
constitutionally compelled to follow the federal "oral sentence controls" rule as a blanket
matter. In fact, by construing Utah law to hold that a criminal sentence has no effect until it
is entered in written form, this Court actually avoids the double jeopardy problem raised by
Wright in this case. Cf. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1217 (Utah 1989) (state law should
be construed to avoid constitutional infirmities).4
To the extent that the federal "oral sentence controls" rule might be
constitutionally driven, it applies to different procedural facts from those presented in this
case. The federal rule applies to situations wherein a written criminal sentence, without
explanation or further hearing, varies from a prior, orally-announced judgment: in such a

4

It is doubtful whether Wright would have a double jeopardy claim even if the trial
court's oral sentence were considered final. The United States Supreme Court has intimated that
"multiple punishments" concerns may not apply to noncapital sentencing at all. See Caspari v.
Bohlen,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 948, 964-55 (1994) (noting the Court's "traditional refusal
to extend the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing . . ."); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33,
37-38 n.6 (1988) (expressly reserving the question).

9

situation, the orally-announced sentence controls. As such, the federal "oral sentence
controls" rule is not grounded in double jeopardy principles. Instead, the federal rule
enforces the due process requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard regarding
sentence. See Villano, 816 F.2d at 1452 ("Sentencing should be conducted with the judge
and defendant facing one another and not in secret").
Due process requirements were honored in this case. Following the initial
oral, unwritten announcement of Wright's sentence, the trial court learned that the twiceordered presentence report was finally forthcoming. At that point the court, properly
desiring to make a fully-informed sentencing decision, promptly set a new sentencing hearing
(R. 98-99).5 At that hearing, Wright, having reviewed the presentence report, reargued his
case for probation rather than state prison incarceration (R. 88-91). That satisfied due
process. See State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d
1048, 1050-51 (Utah App. 1991). Hence the "oral sentence controls" rule advocated by
Wright need not, and should not, be applied to this case.
Despite the Utah rule that no sentence exists until it is properly signed and
filed, Wright contends that the orally-announced sentence did impose punishment upon him,
because he began serving that "sentence" immediately after it was announced (Br. of
Appellant at 24-26). However, the mere fact that Wright remained in jail following the oral
sentence announcement did not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
Instead, that jail time was only an extension of confinement that commonly continues

^Compare United States v. Earley, 816 F.2d 1428, 1434 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (in
waiting five months to correct written sentence, after defendant had begun to serve it, "[t]he
district court acted too late").
10

between the time a criminal defendant pleads or is found guilty, and the time of sentencing.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may
continue or alter bail or recognizance").6
Perhaps some remedy is due to a defendant who is confined for an
unreasonable time after an adjudication of guilt, but before sentencing. Under rule 22(a),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah criminal defendants have a general (but waivable)
expectation of sentencing within thirty days after the guilt finding. Wright was confined for
ninety-eight days between entry of his guilty plea and the trial court's written entry of his
prison sentence-that is, sixty-eight days longer than rule 22(a) contemplates.
Under the circumstances, Wright received an appropriate remedy for that
presentence delay. The mix-up about the presentence report, which caused the initial delay,
cannot be attributed to the prosecution or to trial court error. After that mix-up was
corrected, a large portion of the subsequent delay-from 01 August to 29 August 1994-was
caused by Wright's own request that the trial court consider additional mental health
information (R. 37, 105-06). Ultimately, the trial court credited all of Wright's presentence
confinement, plus his pre-guilty plea confinement, against his prison sentence (R. 38).
Wright needs no further remedy, and double jeopardy law ought not be made more tortuous,
cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 387 (1989), to create a further remedy for him.

Similarly, when a ninety-day presentence "diagnostic evaluation" (a more elaborate
evaluation than occurred in this case) is ordered, the Utah legislature has expressly provided that
the confinement for such evaluation "does not constitute a commitment to prison," although
credit for time in such confinement is given. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(2) (1995).
11

In sum, under Utah law and the facts of this case, the "oral sentence" that
Wright would have this Court enforce was really no sentence at all. He was only punished
once for his offense, when the trial court reconsidered its oral announcement of Wright's
sentence upon review of the presentence report, and entered, upon due notice and hearing, a
more stringent final sentence. Wright's double jeopardy argument therefore fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wright's criminal sentence should be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^LL d a y

o f June

>

1995

-

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

LI^.
J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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VERNICE AH CHING, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, attorneys for defendantappellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this "l I day of June,
1995.
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A dtftndant who is found guilty and —
Constitutionality.
HUy ill should be givtn s sentence of tbt taint
Former Subdivisions (4Xe) and (4Xd)
^ration as any other dtfendant oonvieUd of m
unconstitutional bteaus* nons of tbt consider* the same offense. Committing such a defen*"
ations tbtrtin wu relevant to tbt traatzntnt **nt to tht state mental hospital dote not in-*
rationale. Tht application of tbott provisions t**rupt or extend the length of the defendant's
to a mentally ill criminal dtftndant was thus *otenee. Sutt v. DePionty, 749 FJtd 621
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of tht dut <lltah 1967).
fuaranttt of Utah Const, Art 1,1 7. •^Plaee.
IU v. Copeland, 766 FJZd 1266 (Utah 1968).
Trial court did not err in sentencing defen*
*tnt to tht Utah Sute Prison instead of tht
Availability of pita.
This rult does not require a dtftndant to as- Utah State Hospital, where the court conaicV
sart a dtftnst of not fuilty by rtason of insan* •Nd the testimony of several witnesses and
ity as a condition precedent to tht availability "Und that while defendant had established
of e/uil£y BJ>6 mentally ill instruction and vtr* Ulat ht had a mental illness as defined by stat*
diet Stata v. Young, 663 fJU 327 (Utah 1993). **e, he iii not meet the other criteria required
•fr commitment to the stats hospital. Stata ?.
Availability of trtataent
789 P.2d 27 (Utah 1990); State v.
A finding that traatzntnt is available is rtle* Mdsrtoa,
Anderson,
797 ?2d 416 (Utah 1990).
vant to a dtcision to commit a criminal defen*
A
conviction
of guilty and mentally 01 dots
dant under Subdivision (4). Stats v. Copelsnd,
**t ipso facto entitle the defendant to be com765 tM 1266 (Utah 1968X
^ttad to tht stats hospital rathtr than the
Guilty and mentally QL
•Kte prison. Whether dsfendant is entitled to
Uncontrovtrtod tvidsnet of a dtfendantfs Ptychiatric treatment as a xnstttr of right is a
mental illneaa in connection with afindingof *f*tual issue. Sutt v. Anderson, 797 ?JU 416
guilty rtquirte a trial Judge tofindtht defea* ^tah 19901
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigfcaa Young Law Ravfrw. — Convict* committed mentally ill persons with
ing or Confining? Alternative Directions in In* **uroleptie or antipsychotic drugi as violativt
sanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally 111 • state constitutional guaranty, 74 AXJt4th
Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Ac*
»099.
cjuitteea, 1983 B.Y.U. L Rev. 499.
Instructions in stata criminal east in which
A.LRi — Pyromsnis and tht criminal law.
defendant pleads insanity as to hospital eon*
61 A U U t h 1243.
Probation revocation: insanity as defense* 66 fiftement in event of acquittal, 81 AXJUth
«9.
Auuth
mi
Nonconsensual traatzntnt of involuntarily

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment a^d commitment
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict 0 f guilty or plea of no contest, the
court afiaffeel a toe lor imposing senten^ wMch shaft be not leas than two
nor more than 30 daya after the verdict t* plea, unleaa the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwiae Ordere, Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may conti nut o r .jjter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shaft afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf taj to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to ahow any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney slutf also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defend^ may be tried in his absence, ht
may likewise be sentenced in his absence if * defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court

(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
Cross-Referenoee. — Pieoentence inveetigation, f 764404.
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, UJLE.

Suspending impositiontafaentence and plat*
ing defendant on probation, I 77-18-1.
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Advising defendant of light to appeal.
Illegal sentence.
Jurisdiction.
Sentences.
—Habitual offenders.
—Indefinite suspension of aentence.
Sentencing hearing.
—Continued hearing.
—Evidence.
——Delinquency record.
—Polygraph examination.
——Presentence report.
—Presence of counsel.
—Presence of defendant
—Time.
——Continuance for defendant
——Waiver.
Statements before sentencing.
—Defendant
Cited.
Advising defendant of right to appoaL
Trial court's failure to again advise defendant of his right to appeal at sentencing was
harmless error where trial court had informed
him of such right at the trial and after the
verdict, and he did not object to the timeliness
of the court's advice. Crowe v. State, 649 P£d 2
(Utah 1S82).
Illegal sentence.
A district court may reassume jurisdiction to
correct an erroneous and void sentence, irrespective of the time limits. State v. Lee Urn, 79
Utah 68, 7 ?3d 825 (1932).
Defendant must first ask the trial court to
correct his sentence if he believes that it has
been imposed in an illegal manner. State •.
Brooks, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. S3 (Utah Ct App.
1994).

Sentence*.
—Habitual offenders.
A justice of the peace, after imposing a fine
for drunkenness for violation of a city ordinance, could not thereafter impose a jail aentence under those provisions of ordinance providing for cumulative punishment for a second
or subsequent offense, without taking evidence
upon the question of the previous conviction.
Ex parte Mulliner, 101 Utah 51,117 P-2d 819
(1941).
—Indefinite suspension of aentence. •
The court, by indefinitely suspending aentence, and permitting defendant to go on his
own recognizance, lost jurisdiction of him, ao
that it could not afterwards have him rearrested, and sentence him. In re Flint, 25 Utah
838, 71 P. 531, 95 Am. S t R. 853 (1903).
Sentencing hearing.
—Continued hearing.
Failure to advise accused of nature of the
charge, his plea and the verdict thereon at a
sentencing proceeding which was a continuation of a prior sentence hearing was not reversible error where defendant was adequately apprised of that information in the initial proceeding, although it would have been preferable for defendant to have been advised of those
facts in the continued proceeding. State v.
McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980).
—Evidenee.
cDelinquency record.
A record of delinquency is not admissible in
thtguilt phase of a trial even though it u relevant and materiel to the issues, but the limitation goes only to the use of tht delinquency
record as "evidence* and is not a bar to consideration in the sentencing phase of a criminal
ease. State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah
1980).

Jurisdiction.
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court
does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence
until the sentence has been corrected; however,
once a court imposes a valid aentence, it loaee
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State
v. Montoya, 62$ P.2d 676 (Utah Ct App. 1991).

——Polygraph examination.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to consider at sentencing the results of
the polygraph examination offered by the defendant, who claimed that the test was pertinent to the ultimate question of his guilt, because the issue of defendant's guilt was already
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when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final,
only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft report Before filing his report a master may 6ubmit a draft
thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(D Objections to appointment of master. A party may object to the appointment of any person as a master on the same grounds as a party may
challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action.
Such objections must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a motion.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 53, FJIC.P.

Cross-References. — Challenging of jurors
for cause, U U C P . 47(f).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Scope of appointment
A special master who was directed to review
™P°^*
requests for cost reimbursements exceeded the
—Failure to object.
scope of his appointment by investigating and
——Waiver.
reporting on the issue of attorney's fees since
Scope of appointment.
the court had already ordered an award of atStatus as judicial officer.
torney's fees and the parties had no notice that
_
the master was to review that award nor did
Report.
t n e parties have an opportunity to participate
—.Fniltir* tn nhi*r4_
*n the master's proceedings. Plumb v. State,
J
S09 PJ&d 734 (Utah 1990).
——Waiver.
g u t u f ag j u d i c i a J office
One who made no objection to masters re^ duties ^ obliga.
A g p e c i a f ffiasUr ^
port as required by this rule could not question Um o f t j u d i c i a l oKlceTt ^ ^ AmM n o t
the report for the first time on appeal from dis- e n g a g e m unethical ex parte contacts with the
trict court order adopting the master's find- judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent
ings. Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d S67 (Utah to the substance of the referral. Plumb v. State,
1980).
809 PJ2d 734 (Utah 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity testimony heard by predecessor, 70 AXJtSd
f § 226,228, 66 Am. Jur. 2d References f i 1 et 1079.
aeq., 30 et seq.
Referee's failure to file report within time
C.J.S. — 30A C J.S. Equity <f 515, 520,521 specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
to 528,532,533,535,537,539 et seq.; 76 C J.S. M terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.
References §§ 7 et seq., 60 to 110,122 et aeq.
what are "exceptional conditions'' justifying
A . L R - Bankruptcy, right of creditor who ^f^^
^fa Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b).
has not filed timely petition for review of ref- j AX.R Fed 922
Power of .ooeuot or lubnituUJ n u U r or
referee to render decision or enter judgment on

« < •» « * • B t t o » » » S e t « . . . » 1 0 7 7 , »
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PART vn.
•JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain, a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-

tion and direction, any oraer or omer iorm
which abjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment
(1) Generally, Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, everyfinaljudgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each aide as
between or among themselves*
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry ofjudgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (dX3)
and (dX4), relating to the award of costa by the
appellate court and costs in original proceed*
ingt before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel.
late Procedure, effective January 1,1985. See,
now, Rule M(«, Utah R£PP*.
.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to

tion to require payment of costs, UJtCP.
40(b).
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costa,
| 49-6-S0L
sute, payment of costa awarded against,
| 7S-27.13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims,
UJICP 62(hX
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Chad is Oil Shale Corp. •. Larson, 20 Uufc
U S69, 438 ?M $40 (1968).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. Sd. — 22A Am. Jar. 2d Declare- declaratory relief is state court, S3 AUR.4&
lory Judgment* il 183, 186, 203 at seq.
146.
CJ.S. — 26 CJB. Declaratory Judgment!
Key Number*. — Declaratory Judgment *•
l i 17, 18, 104, 1S5.
41, 42, 251, 367.
A U l — Eight to jury the! in action far

Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 64(b), judgment upon the verdict
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk andfiled.If there is a special
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The prevailing party shall
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court However, the time forfilinga notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue offset and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the
defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs
of entry, if any.
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
Crow-References. — Judgment against
(d) it intended to remedy the difficulties sug- person dying after verdict or decision, not a
getted by Thompson r. Ford Motor Co., 14 lien on realty, I 78-22-1.1.
Uuh 2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963).
Judgment by confeesion authorised, I 76-22Compiler's Notee. — The subject matter of S.
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a),
FJLCP.

Opening default or default judgment dtimed
ID have been obtained became of attorney'e
mistake at to time or place of appearance,
trial or filing of naceeaary papers, 21 AX&£d
1255.
Validity and construction of constitution or
etatute authorizinf exclusion of public in aex
effenat case*, 39 A.LRSd 652.
Eifbt of accuaed to have preas or ether Bodia
repreMDUtivee excluded from criminal thai,
49 AXAJd 1007.

Power of court to impoee standard of per*
ecu*] appearance or attire, 73 ALRSd 353.
What amounU to "appearance'' under atattrte or rule requiring notice, to party who has
"appeared," of intention to take deleult judgment, 73 AXJL3d 1250.
Applicability of Judicial immunity to acta of
clerk of court under etate law, *4 J L U U t h
1186.
Key Numbers. — Clarke of Courte e» 24,06;
Court* e» 61 ei eeq.; Judgment e» 276; Motions
• 67; Trial e* a, 20.

Rules 78 to 80. Repealed.
Bepeal*. — Rule 78, relating to motion day,
Bull 79, relating to books and record* kept by
the atari, and Rule 80, relating to reporter!

and record tranacripta, were repealed by eider
of the Supreme Court, affective May 2* 1WL

PART XL
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in generaL
(a) Special statutory proceedinga. These rule* shall apply to til special
atatutory proceedings, except insofar as auch rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, auch procedure ahall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedinga
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement
of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar aa auch
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure
in appealingfromor obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement
City courte. — Former I 78-4-32, as en*
acted by L 1977, eh. 77,1 1, transferred the
jurisdiction and power* of the city court* to the
municipal department* of the circuit eourta.
For circuit court jurisdiction generally, aee TV
tie ?a, Chapter 4.

Crot*-Reference*. — Administrative Rule*
msting Act, I 63-46a»l et eeq.
Circuit eourta generally, I 76-4-1 et aeq.
Justice court* generally, I 7S-M0I at esq.
Uniform Probate Coda, Title 75.
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Administrative proceedings.
City and justice*' eourta.
Criminal proceedings.
Special statutory proceedings.
Cited.
Adminiitrative proceedtafa.
The Utah Hulet of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to a proceeding before an administra-

tive body aeeklnf to regulate activities Bur*
dened with e public interest. Entre Nous Club
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 2S7 P.2d 670 (1955).
Rule 6(e) is not inconsistent with, nor dearly
inapplicable to, the procedure of the Industrial
Commission and therefore supplement* the
procedure of the Commission, Griffith v. Industrial CommX IS Utah 2d 264, S99 PJ2A 204
(1965).
;
Where road commission9* order that sign be

